<p>Meanwhile, the Navy found itself in a major sea battle in the Leyte Gulf, supporting MacArthur's return to the Philippines, and cancelled its share of the first Tokyo strike. Admiral Nimitz recommended that the B-29s be grounded until the Navy could support them properly. He also suggested that the B-29s be used to mine the Japanese sea lanes, rather than sending the big planes off on strategic bombing missions.
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<p>Then General Kenney chimed in with a letter to Arnold saying that the B-29s could not do the job from Saipan because they lacked the range and that, even if they could, the Japanese fighters would destroy them at will. His basic argument—range—was a touchy issue. Air Transport Command, which controlled worldwide movements of all military aircraft, had refused to let the B-29s fly in squadron formation from San Francisco to Hawaii, just 2,400 miles (3,860 km) distant. ATC's argument was that the Superforts did not have the range for formation flight over that distance. The irony was that once the B-29s got to Saipan, their main mission was to fly in squadron formation for more than 3,000 miles (4,825 km), while loaded with bombs.
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<p>Arnold took a consensus of his top air commanders, who agreed with Kenney, and sent that news to Hansell. With it was a personal note that said, in effect, if you still think you can get away with it, good luck!
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<p>The final input came from Brigadier General Emmett O'Donnell, commander of the 73rd Wing, who told Hansell that they were in no position to carry out the planned mission, and suggested that it be changed to a night attack. Hansell saw that whole coalescence of events as pivotal to the future of strategic bombing. If he agreed with Nimitz, it was an admission that the B-29s could not operate without Navy support. If he agreed with Kenney, it would probably mean that the Twentieth Air Force would become another component of Far East Air Forces. If he agreed with 'Rosey' O'Donnell, it meant that primary targets could not be attacked, raising questions about the need for the specialized force of the XX and XXI Bomber Commands. The political and strategic implications were many. Hansell weighed them, and gave the order to go as planned. Mission San Antonio I was dispatched as scheduled.
